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TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC 
Robert E. Shalhope* 
When "The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment" 
appeared seventeen years ago, my primary intent was to shed 
new light on the intellectual life of the early republic-to employ 
an analysis of the amendment as a window into the political cul-
ture of eighteenth-century America.1 Previous research had con-
vinced me of the powerful shaping influence of republicanism 
during this time;2 consequently, I initiated this new investigation 
by subjecting the republican literature so central to Revolution-
ary thought to a fresh reading. It soon became apparent to me 
that four principles relevant to the formation of the Second 
Amendment coursed throughout this literature: the right of indi-
vidual citizens to possess arms; the fear of professional standing 
armies; the reliance on militias composed of armed citizens; and 
the subordination of the military to civilian control. When the 
Second Amendment assumed its final form the emphasis on the 
armed citizen and organized militias assumed precedence. In my 
mind James Madison and his colleagues joined these two distinct 
yet vitally interrelated rights in an effort to balance as best they 
could individual rights with communal responsibilities.3 
At the time "Ideological Origins" appeared, the Second 
Amendment had remained in relative obscurity since its ratifica-
tion two hundred years earlier. This is most assuredly not the 
case today. In the last decade alone analysis of the Second 
Amendment has become a virtual cottage industry among law 
professors; law reviews from the most prestigious to the most 
• George Lynn Cross Professor of History, University of Oklahoma. 
1. Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. of 
Am. Hist. 599 (1982). 
2. Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Un-
derstanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 Wm. & Mary Q. 49-80 
(1972), and Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 
Wm. & Mary Q. 334-56 (1982). 
3. The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. of Am. 
Hist. 587-92 (1984). 
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obscure have published essay after essay dealing with various 
aspects of the Amendment.4 Many of these authors borrowed 
liberally from "Ideological Origins" or cited it to support their 
arguments. Most displayed little if any interest in the political 
culture that spawned the Second Amendment; those that did 
displayed an appalling ignorance of this intellectual climate. The 
result was, of course, an incredibly anachronistic presentation of 
the Second Amendment. Quotations taken entirely out of con-
text were strung together as if language conveyed the same 
meaning at all times and in all circumstances. Consequently, as 
these scholars subjected the words and phrases of the Amend-
ment itself (as well as a wide range of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century literature) to the most tortured linguistic 
analysis, a flat, static vocabulary emerged that bore no relation 
to the dynamic culture of the early republic. The end result has 
been the "Standard Model"5 of interpreting the Second 
Amendment and an equally strained and intemperate opposition 
to this mode of analysis.6 
More than anything else, then, history has been the greatest 
casualty of this surge of publication. In their urgency to pro-
pound a particular view of the Amendment that fits their current 
ideological demands, jurists have either ignored the political cul-
ture of the early republic or framed it in such a way as to suit 
their needs. The dynamic relationship between text and context 
has been lost. Fortunately, several historians-Saul Cornell, Mi-
chael Bellesiles, and Gary Wills-have recently turned their at-
tention to the historical circumstances within which the Second 
Amendment appeared. Their work promises to provide much 
greater depth and sophistication to our understanding of the 
early republic-an understanding that not only furthers our 
knowledge of that era, but sheds essential new light on the 
meaning of the Second Amendment within that culture. 
In the essay written for this forum Professor Cornell, draw-
ing upon an extensive knowledge of Antifederalism,7 provides 
4. Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates incorporate the vast bulk of this literature 
in their essay Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 Emory L.J. 
1139-259 (1996). 
5. Glenn Harlan Reynolds employs this term to describe the scholarship espousing 
both an individual and a collective right of the people to bear arms to protect themselves 
and to act as a check upon governmental tyranny in A Critical Guide to the Second 
Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461-512 (1995). 
6. See Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dere-
liction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 57-153 (1995). 
7. See the following essays by Professor Cornell: Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideol-
ogy of Backcountry Anti-Federalism, 76 J. of Am. Hist. 1148-72 (1990); Moving Beyond 
1999] TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 271 
fresh insights into the intellectual and social context of the Sec-
ond Amendment. He not only reveals the failure of Standard 
Modelers to place the language of the Founders and others 
within the context of the time, but exposes the weaknesses in-
herent in their insistence upon a consensus among eighteenth-
century Americans regarding the true meaning of the Amend-
ment.8 Through a focus on events in Pennsylvania during the 
founding era, Cornell provides us with a fascinating picture of 
the multiplicity of perspectives held by Pennsylvanians on the 
issues of arms, the state, and insurrection against established 
authority. 
In his discussion of the Test Acts, first enacted in 17n, Cor-
nell reveals the commitment of Pennsylvania's Constitutionalists 
to a republican ethos based on a traditional communal percep-
tion of rights rather than the modern liberal one to which we ad-
here today.9 These Acts, based on a republican notion of the 
common good, emanated from a belief that it was perfectly in 
keeping with that good for the state to define who could and 
who could not enjoy the full benefits of citizenship. This ex-
tended to the right of citizens to posses arms for their own de-
fense as well as that of the state. Thus, the state had not only the 
power, but the responsibility, to disarm those disloyal to its 
authority. Consequently the state government did disarm large 
numbers of Pennsylvanians. 
Cornell's discussion of "The Dissent of the Majority" writ-
the Canon of Traditional Constitutional History: Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights, and 
the Promise of Post-Modern Historiography, 12 L. & Hist. Rev. 1-28 (1994); Mere 
Parchment Barriers? Antifederalists, the Bill of Rights, and the Question of Rights Con-
sciousness, in Ronald Hoffman and Peter Albert, eds., The Bill of Rights: Government 
Proscribed 175-208 (U. Press of Virginia, 1997). 
8. Here Cornell is responding to statements such as that made by Randy Barnett 
and Don Kates to the effect that there is "virtual unanimity [among legal scholars and 
historians] that there is no tenable textual or historical argument against a broad individ-
ual right view of the Second Amendment." Barnett and Kates, 45 Emory L.J. at 1141 
(cited in note 4). For a more sophisticated treatment of the creation of the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights, see Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the 
Making of the Constitution (Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). As the title indicates, Rakove deals 
with the multiple perceptions or meanings that various Founders brought to their discus-
sion of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
9. While Cornell believes that Daniel T. Rodgers delivered a "post-mortem" on 
the idea of a republican synthesis in his essay Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 76 
J. of Am. Hist. 11-38 (1992), it is clear that he, like so many other historians, recognizes 
republicanism as one of the powerful ideologies so influential in shaping the thoughts 
and actions of individuals and groups during the founding era. For insights into the man-
ner in which those various idioms were melded during this era, see James T. Kloppen-
berg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early Ameri-
can Discourse, 74 J. of Am. Hist. 9-33 (1987), and Isaac Kramnick, The "Great National 
Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787,45 Wm. & Mary Q. 3-33 (1988). 
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ten in opposition to the federal Constitution by Pennsylvania 
Antifederalists reveals this same republican ethos. While the 
"Dissent" clearly does state that "the people have a right to bear 
arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the 
United States, or for the purpose of killing game," Cornell points 
out the significance of the following clause, which read "and no 
law should be passed for disarming the people or any of them, 
unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from 
individuals." In his mind the phrase disallowing the legislature of 
the United States from restraining the citizens of Pennsylvania 
from hunting and fishing on their own lands or common lands 
within the state is equally important. All these provisions drew 
their meaning from the republican ethos within which they were 
so deeply embedded. Like the authors of the Test Acts, the 
Pennsylvania Antifederalists who supported the minority dissent 
believed that their state government had a responsibility to care 
for the common good. While skeptical of the augmented power 
of the federal government, these people were perfectly willing to 
allow their own state government to disarm those posing "a real 
danger of public injury" or to place restrictions on the citizen's 
rights of hunting or fishing. In their minds the "people" was not 
all inclusive; it represented only the loyal citizens of the state, 
those committed to the common good of their society. Clearly, 
this was another time, another place-a world we have lost. The 
Antifederalists of Pennsylvania understood liberty within the 
context of eighteenth-century republicanism, not in terms of 
modem liberal rights-based constitutional theories. 
Cornell's discussion of the Carlisle Riot and the Whiskey 
Rebellion speaks to quite a different issue: the insurrectionary 
right of citizens to take up arms against established authority-
to act as a check upon tyrannical government. When radical An-
tifederalists-"plebeian democrats" in Cornell's terminology-
armed themselves against state authorities they clearly believed 
the militia to be literally the entire body of the people in arms 
and that these people might spontaneously organize to resist 
what they perceived to be governmental tyranny. But those who 
had been involved in writing both the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights-Antifederalists as well as Federalists-united in op-
position to such uprisings. These people distinguished between 
the orderly use of extra-legal action during the Revolution-
when the people had no legal recourse to challenge the unjust 
acts of Parliament-and the insurrections in western 
Pennsylvania. All agreed that individuals could not 
spontaneously constitute themselves as militia units outside the 
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selves as militia units outside the control of the state or assert an 
individual right to bear arms to check government tyranny. 
While Pennsylvania Antifederalists were intent upon protecting 
their state militia against incursions of federal authority, they 
meant at the same time for their own militias to support the 
authority of the state. Spontaneous actions to organize a militia 
outside that authority represented threats to the common good 
and must be put down by their own regularly established state 
militia, or the federal government if that help was necessary. The 
good order of the state remained uppermost in their minds. 
For his part, Michael Bellesiles addresses many of these 
same issues. At work on a book dealing with the gun culture in 
America, Bellesiles offers some intriguing preliminary findings. 
First, in an essay dealing with gun laws in early America, he con-
tends that both the content and intent of the laws he discusses 
matched contemporary social values and that these same laws 
intended gun ownership to be precisely constrained by law.10 
Through a focus on Virginia and Connecticut Bellesiles provides 
ample substantiation for his thesis. In Virginia the colonial leg-
islature encouraged the ownership of guns by white male prop-
erty owners, while at the same time prohibiting slaves and inden-
tured servants from owning such weapons. Since the militia in 
Virginia served primarily as a means of protecting the colony 
from internal subversion, only trustworthy inhabitants could be 
allowed to carry weapons. In Connecticut the assembly at-
tempted to arm all able-bodied males, except Indians. The leg-
islature specifically prohibited the arming of Indians and eventu-
ally passed legislation to seize firearms held by Indians. During 
the Revolution the state government did all in its power to im-
press whatever firearms it could to be used by its militia and had 
no qualms at all about confiscating firearms held by loyalists. In 
both Virginia and Connecticut, state legislatures, much like the 
Pennsylvania example discussed by Cornell, based gun regula-
tion upon the concept of public safety. Only loyal citizens should 
have the right to keep and bear arms. 
Bellesiles reasons that a legitimate interpretation of the in-
tent of the Founders in framing the Second Amendment may be 
deduced from the pattern of legislation that emerged initially 
within the various colonial assemblies and then among the sepa-
rate state legislatures. The pattern that appears represented a 
10. Michael Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: The Regulation of Firearms 
Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 567-89 (1998). 
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distinct concern for the common good. The idea of an unre-
strained citizenry was anathema to the Founders; it was only 
through "well regulated" militias that public safety could be en-
sured. States had every right to deny gun ownership to those 
perceived as threats to public safety. Over time this had included 
large groups of people: indentured servants, slaves, Indians, and 
loyalists. In his mind, then, the Founders intended to create "a 
theoretical structure of freedoms that they never intended for 
universal application. "11 By this he means that they meant to re-
strict the suffrage to white male property owners and had no in-
tention that slaves should enjoy freedom of speech and assem-
bly. Legislation passed by the states indicated that gun 
ownership was also among these limited rights. At the time of 
the writing of the Second Amendment every state in the union 
sought to limit the extent of that privilege to loyal citizens and 
experienced no hesitation whatsoever in disarming large num-
bers of inhabitants within its jurisdiction. 
In another essay Bellesiles explodes the myth of near uni-
versal gun ownership and the skilled usage of firearms in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a myth so important 
to Standard Modelers in their efforts to protect a "traditional" 
right.12 In fact, during an investigation of late eighteenth-century 
probate records and militia archives extending into the early 
nineteenth century, Bellesiles discovered that only fourteen per-
cent of probate inventories exhibited any type of gun within 
frontier households of northern New England and western 
Pennsylvania. Beyond that, militia records indicated that weap-
ons of any sort were far from universally owned; in fact, state 
governments had a difficult time mustering armed militiamen 
even as late as the Civil War. It was that conflict that set Amer-
ica on the road to becoming a gun culture. With the emergence 
of mass produced weapons and immense numbers of men under 
arms, familiarity with weapons and their easy accessibility 
helped-with the determined assistance of the newly formed Na-
tional Rifle Association- to transform America into a gun cul-
ture. 
While Bellesiles provides excellent new insights into the so-
cial and intellectual context within which the Second Amend-
ment emerged, he also falls prey to what may well be an anach-
ronistic interpretation of the Second Amendment. In both essays 
11. ld. at 589. 
12. Michael Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States, 1760-1865, 
83 J. of Am. Hist. 425-55 (1996). 
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he stoutly maintains that the Second Amendment "is the only 
amendment with a preamble establishing its purpose, clearly 
stated to be a 'well regulated Militia."' 13 The very idea that this 
was the only amendment with such a preamble should by itself 
give pause to any scholar familiar with the origins of the Consti-
tution and the Bill of Rights. Actually, the origin of the thesis 
that the initial phrase in the Amendment serves as a context-
establishing clause for what follows is relatively recent and stems 
from quite contemporary ideological needs.14 
Bellesiles cites an essay by Gary Wills as his primary source 
for the belief that the Second Amendment included a purposeful 
preamble establishing a well regulated militia as the definitive 
purpose of the Amendment.15 In many ways this is a particularly 
puzzling essay. While clearly intent upon discrediting Standard 
Modelers, Wills claims that he does not deny the right of private 
individuals to own and use firearms. This right he believes can be 
defended on the grounds of natural law, common law, or statute. 
He also concedes that most Americans "assumed such a right in 
the 1780s-so naturally, in fact, that the question was not 'up' 
and calling for specific guarantees" when the Second Amend-
ment was framed. 16 For cultural historians, such a perception is a 
commonplace. As Louis Wirth so cogently observed, "the most 
elemental and important facts about a society are those that are 
seldom debated and generally regarded as settled."17 John Stuart 
Mill also understood that "the obvious and universal facts, which 
every one sees and no one is astonished at, it seldom occurs to 
any one to place upon record. "18 Such an understanding is crucial 
to those who would attempt to contextualize the Second 
Amendment. To distinguish between natural rights and constitu-
13. ld. at 454. The same assertion appears in Bellesiles, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. at 588 
(cited in note 10). 
14. The most authoritative statement of the idea that the Second Amendment con-
tains a "purposive preamble" appears in Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 
299 n.6 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988). A much shorter version of this precise footnote, 
which appeared ten years earlier in the first edition of Tribe's book, did not include such 
a statement. Tribe incorporated this thought in the much longer note that appears in his 
second edition in direct response to an article by Don Kates, Handgun Prohibition and 
the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204-73 (1983). Appar-
ently Tribe felt the necessity of thwarting the ideas of this leading Standard Modeler and 
so added this statement, which emanated from his own ideological predilections rather 
than from any additional research into the subject. 
15. Gary Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, XLII N.Y. Rev. of Books 62-73 (Sept. 21, 
1995). 
16. ld. at 72. 
17. Louis Wirth, Preface in Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction 
to the Sociology of Knowledge xxiv (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946). 
18. John Stuart Mill, The Spirit of the Age 5 (U. of Chicago Press, 1942). 
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tional rights is certainly valid when analyzing the constitutional-
ity of an issue, but obfuscates any attempt to get at the intellec-
tual context within which any text existed.19 And yet this is ex-
actly what Gary Wills attempts to do. He claims that James 
Madison did not address the issue of private rights when writing 
the Second Amendment; instead, Wills claims that Madison 
meant only to finesse Antifederalist opposition to the Constitu-
tion by responding to their concern to protect and perpetuate 
their own state militias. Consequently, Madison's "sentence 
structure set as totally military a context for this amendment as 
for the Third. Every term in the Second Amendment, taken sin-
gly, has as its first and most obvious meaning a military meaning. 
Taken together, each strengthens the significance of all the oth-
ers as part of a military rhetoric. "20 
It is this thesis that dominates the essay. And the essay is 
vintage Wills. In his characteristic slash and burn style, he 
mocks, ridicules, and patronizes the Standard Modelers. Their 
citations "turn out to be truncated, removed from context, 
twisted, or applied to a debate different from that over the Sec-
ond Amendment"21 and their construction of the Amendment 
"entirely fanciful."22 Wills reaches such conclusions by means of 
an extremely narrow treatment of the Amendment. He is con-
cerned only with arguments bearing on the writing of the 
Amendment itself. His is a constitutional analysis of the 
Amendment entirely shorn of the larger intellectual environ-
ment-natural rights, common law, statute-that enveloped it. 
Even within such a constricted framework, Wills must be at 
his disingenuous best to carry off such a line of reasoning. He 
begins by asserting that when James Madison presented his first 
draft of the Amendment to Congress ("The right of the people 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and 
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; 
but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be 
compelled to render military service in person.") the second 
19. Cornell draws this same distinction between natural and constitutional rights. 
Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, The Second Amend· 
ment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 Const. 
Comm. 221 (1999). This is surprising in an essay that attempts to contextualize the Sec-
ond Amendment. If we are to reconstruct the intellectual and social environment within 
which the Amendment appeared, we must do it in total, considering natural as well as 
constitutional rights. 
20. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms at 72 (cited in note 15). 
21. ld. at 62. 
22. I d. at 67. 
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clause-the well regulated militia-provided the reason for the 
right's existence. Then, when the final version of the Amend-
ment appeared ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed") he insists that it is now the first 
clause that forms "the preamble, the 'whereas,' the context-
establishing clause"23 that established the framework for what 
followed! Even for Gary Wills this is no meant feat. First be-
comes last and last becomes first only if the reader accepts Wills 
at his word that the whole sentence-no matter the ordering of 
its separate phrases- "has as its first and most obvious meaning 
a military meaning." It seems never to enter his mind that Madi-
son's original sentence structure mirrored perfectly that of the 
First Amendment, which listed distinct yet vitally interrelated 
rights in precisely the same manner that Madison did in his ini-
tial wording of the Second Amendment. 
Wills then restricts his discussion strictly to narrow constitu-
tional grounds-the precise language of the Amendment shed of 
all the "debris" dealing with natural rights or common law that 
Standard Modelers persist in mentioning. This enables him to 
exclude, for example, responses made by various towns to the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which claimed that the 
people of that state had a "right of enjoying and defending their 
lives and liberties" (Article I) and "to keep and to bear arms for 
the common defense" (Article XVII). This wording caused a 
number of towns to demand more precise language in order to 
spell out the individual's right to possess arms in his own de-
fense. The citizens of Northampton, for instance, resolved: 
We also judge that the people's right to keep and bear arms, 
declared in the seventeenth article of the same declaration is 
not expressed with that ample and manly openness and lati-
tude which the importance of the right merits; and therefore 
propose that it should run in this or some such like manner, to 
wit, The people have a right to keep and bear arms as well for 
their own as the common defence. Which mode of expression 
we are of opinion would harmonize much better with the first 
article than the form of expression used in the said seven-
teenth article.24 
For their part, inhabitants of Williams burgh stated: 
23. Id. at 63. 
24. Oscar and Mary Handlin, eds., The Popular Sources of Political Authority: 
Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 at 574 (Harvard U. Press, 1966). 
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Upon reading the 17th Article in the Bill of Rights. Voted that 
these words their Own be inserted which makes it read thus: 
that the people have a right to keep and to bear Arms for 
their Own and the Common defence. 
Voted Nemine Contradic.-----
Our reasons gentlemen for making this Addition Are these. 1" 
that we esteem it an essential priviledge to keep Arms in Our 
houses for Our Own Defence and while we Continue honest 
and Lawful Subjects of Government we Ought Never to be 
deprived of them. "25 
Even if one allows Wills to ignore such clear statements of 
the private nature of the right of gun ownership, what are we to 
do with Madison's own observations made in direct relation to 
the writing of the Second Amendment? When Madison first of-
fered the amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, he sug-
gested that they be inserted directly into the body of the Consti-
tution in article I, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4.26 He did not 
separate the right to bear arms from other rights designed to 
protect the individual; nor did he suggest placing it in section 8, 
clauses 15 and 16, which dealt specifically with arming and or-
ganizing the militia.27 When preparing notes for an address sup-
porting the amendments, Madison reminded himself: "They re-
late 1st to private rights. "28 When he consulted Edmund 
Pendleton on the matter, Madison emphasized that "amend-
ments may be employed to quiet the fears of many by supplying 
those further guards for private rights. "29 
Wills devotes the great bulk of his essay to the "historic con-
text" of the Second Amendment. By "historic context" he does 
not mean the social, intellectual, or ideological environment 
within which the Amendment was written; instead he simply 
means the eighteenth-century definitions for the terms bear 
arms, to keep, well-regulated, and the people found in the Oxford 
English Dictionary. His analysis of to bear, well-regulated, and 
the people is astute and helps rescue these terms from the dis-
torted meanings ascribed to them by so many Standard Model-
ers. In addition, his treatment of these terms lends support to the 
25. ld. at 624. 
26. Charles F. Hobson, et al., eds., 12 The Papers of James Madison 201 (U. Press of 
Virginia, 1979). 
27. ld. at 193,201. 
28. ld. at 193. 
29. Hobson, 2 The Papers of James Madison at 307 (cited in note 26). 
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analyses of the concepts of a well regulated militia and the peo-
ple offered by Bellesiles and Cornell. Loyal citizens were to bear 
arms in their various established (well-regulated) state militias in 
order to protect those state governments from internal subver-
sion and external attack. Above all, the people existed in the 
co~orate sense envisioned by late-eighteenth-century republi-
camsm. 
In his examination of the term to keep, however, Wills re-
sorts to the same "linguistic tricks" he repeatedly ascribes to 
Standard Modelers. It is his single-minded belief that "every 
term in the Second Amendment, taken singly, has as its first and 
most obvious meaning a military meaning" and that "taken to-
gether, each strengthens the significance of all the others as part 
of a military rhetoric" that creates problems for him. In his mind 
"to keep and bear" refer entirely to the militia. To view these 
verbs disjunctively, to consider them as separate activities-
keeping arms in the home as a private right and bearing them in 
the militia as a communal responsibility- is ridiculous in his 
mind. Wills declares that to view "keep" to mean "possess 
personally at home" is "a lot to load into one word."30 He then 
proceeds to pile a load upon the term that exceeds even his 
powers of linguistic prestidigitation. Wills carefully chooses 
citations from English libertarians and the Articles of 
Confederation ("debris" when employed by Standard Modelers) 
that mention the ability or right of established governments to 
"keep up" a standing army, a militia, or an armory and then 
assumes this to be the meaning intended by the Founders. While 
the O.E.D. offers an incredibly complex etymology for the word 
"keep," the twenty-ninth definition of the word is "actively to 
hold in possession; to retain in one's power or control; to 
continue to have, hold, or possess." "Keep up" in the manner 
that Wills employs it does not appear until the fifty-seventh 
usage. It must be remembered that Madison and his colleagues 
employed the term to keep and bear, not to keep up and bear, or 
to bear and keep up. The later two phrases clearly would have 
born a strictly military meaning. The former does not, and the 
Founders purposely chose this usage. It would appear, then, that 
Wills, in his effort to propound his ideological position, attempts 
the same "alchemical change of substance" that he discovers in 
so much work of the Standard Modelers. If one Standard 
Modeler was guilty of bringing "two words ... near to, but not 
30. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms at 66 (cited in note 15). 
280 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 16:269 
into, the amendment,"31 Wills is guilty of claiming that Madison 
and his colleagues left out a word they really meant to include. 
Parsing the words and phrases of the Second Amendment 
contributes precious little to our understanding of the early re-
public. While there is little doubt that the O.E.D. can be useful 
in helping historians determine the contemporary meanings of 
particular words, it is not definitive when standing alone. Schol-
ars must also familiarize themselves as best they can with the 
larger social and intellectual context of an era. My own research 
over the last decade has led me to the conclusion that two cul-
tural impulses-republicanism (emphasis on community) and 
liberalism (emphasis upon individualism) coursed through the 
lives of late-eighteenth century Americans. At times the two 
seemed to run parallel to one another, at other times they 
melded into a nearly indistinguishable whole. In many ways, re-
publicanism-a familiar ideology permeating all walks of life-
shaped Americans' thoughts; it provided them with meaning and 
identity in their lives. Liberalism-still an unarticulated behav-
ioral pattern more than a sharply delineated mode of thought-
unconsciously shaped their day-to-day activity. Most Americans 
clung to a harmonious, corporate view of themselves and their 
society even while behaving in a materialistic, utilitarian manner 
in their daily lives. Thus while rapidly transforming their society 
in an open, competitive, modern direction, Americans continued 
to idealize communal harmony and a virtuous social order.32 
Their corporate and individualistic natures existed in an equilib-
rium unique to the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
centuries. It is this balance between the organic whole and the 
atomized part that disappeared as America became a modern, 
liberal society. 
Given this perspective, I continue to maintain that the Sec-
ond Amendment represented an attempt to meld two distinct 
but dynamically interrelated rights-the individual right to keep 
firearms in the home for personal use and the communal right to 
maintain state militias composed of these armed individuals to 
protect established authority. The research of Cornell, Bellesiles, 
and to some extent Wills, however, convinces me that I must 
qualify my original thesis. I was much too modern in my under-
standing of the armed individual and consequently created far 
31. !d. at 64. 
32. Robert E. Shalhopc, The Roots of Democracy: American Thoughr and Culture, 
1760·1800 (Twayne, 1990); Benningron and the Green Mountain Boys: The Emergence of 
Liberal Democracy in Vermont, 1760·1850 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1996). 
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too inclusive an individual right to bear arms. I failed to ac-
knowledge the continued influence of the corporate or commu-
nal side of republicanism and thus applied a modern, liberal 
rights-based perspective to this aspect of the Amendment that 
wrenched it from its contemporary context. The "people" of the 
separate states did indeed have a right to keep firearms in their 
homes for their own personal use, but the "people" in the early 
republic was a much less expansive term than it is today; it in-
cluded only the those deemed "honest and Lawful Subjects" by 
their separate state governments. And these governments had 
not only the power but the responsibility to restrict the rights 
and privileges of citizenship-including the right to possess pri-
vate arms-in order to promote the public good-the preemi-
nent goal of republican government. This is, of course, not the 
same as claiming that citizens of these states held their arms "in 
trust for the state. "33 They most decidedly did not. 
Whether the findings of Cornell, Bellesiles, or Wills will 
have any effect upon Standard Modelers is doubtful. The goal of 
the Standard Modelers is not to understand early American cul-
ture; it is to affect the manner in which the Supreme Court in-
terprets the Second Amendment in some "landmark" case they 
hope will arise in the near future. In any event, the recent work 
of Cornell and Bellesiles has raised the level of discourse about 
the Second Amendment by restoring it to its historical context. 
Whether armed citizens or militias have any relevance in our so-
ciety as we enter the twenty-first century is a matter for our 
courts and legislatures to determine. If, however, Standard 
Modelers hope to draw upon the original context of the Second 
Amendment, they need to be aware of the corporate nature of 
American society in the late eighteenth century. Regulation of 
the rights and privileges of their citizens was an expected respon-
sibility of the separate state governments. And this certainly in-
cluded the right to regulate the keeping and bearing of private 
firearms. 
33. Bellesiles, Gun Laws at 581, 585 (cited in note 10). In making such a claim, 
Bellesiles exaggerates the corporate nature of late eighteenth-century republicanism. For 
insight into the manner in which corporate and individualistic thought melded during this 
era, see Kloppenberg, The Vinues of Liberalism (cited in note 9). 
